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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
enterprise, should be absorbed as a cost of that enterprise. This
loss is not to be shifted to a negligent defendant who under the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence, would normally
have an affirmative defense against such a transfer. This being
the net result of the present decision, then, the overall effect
is not only the weakening of the common law doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence, but also the erosion of the foundation upon which
the concept of vicarious liability of a master rests.
DANIEL J. McALEER
PRODUCTS LIABILITY - STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY - ABSO-
LUTENESS OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT-A customer who was
injured when a soft drink bottle fell from a cardboard six-pack
carton as she attempted to remove it from a shelf in a grocery
store brought an action for personal injuries. Subsequently, the
grocery store was awarded indemnity against the bottler for any
sum it might be ordered to pay the customer. The court awarded
plaintiff two thousand dollars on the new strict liability doctrine
with one vigorous dissent attacking this new doctrine. Kroger Co.
v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Kentucky 1967).
The Kentucky Supreme Court faced the problem of strict li-
ability in tort and had to determine the extent of liability which a
manufacturer is to be held in evidence of a defect in his product.
In other words, whether or not to distinguish between the theory
of absolute liability such as is found in cases dealing with ultra-
hazardous activities, or dangerous animals 2 and the strict or
"special" liability of a manufacturer to the ultimate user or con-
sumer?
In the United States, the law of products liability has developed
along various legal theories from the old doctrine of caveat emptor
or "let the buyer beware." Until recently the notable character-
istic of all these advancements toward increased seller's liability
was that they required fault. The order of theories tending to
increase the liability included: express warranty with privity; neg-
ligence in the absence of privity in inherently dangerous goods;
express warranty without privity; and, lastly, implied warranty
without privity. Since 1960, a few jurisdictions have taken a dras-
1. Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
2. Zurek v. Fredericks. 138 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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tic step in department from the fundamental principle requiring
fault and by applying a new doctrine of strict liability in tort have
advanced into the realm of products liability without fault. 3
This historical trend toward the special liability of manufactur-
ers has certain reasons. First, it is to do away with the require-
ment of privity of contract. The rule of strict liability "applies
although the user or consumer has not brought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.'"4  This
necessity was produced by the impersonal nature of our modern
economy. Secondly, the rule of strict liability "applies although
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product. ' ' 5 This reasoning is exemplified in the Cali-
fornia decision which stated that the manufacturer was responsible
whether negligent or not.6 This new doctrine develops the ration-
alization of many courts in implying warranty. It is an effort to
escape the bounds of normal negligence law by seeking to help
plaintiffs otherwise frustrated because of the difficult task of prov-
ing fault against a producer who often controls all of the sources
of evidence. The main purpose of this new theory of liability,
however, is to place the burden of accidental harm caused by
products intended for consumption upon those who market them
so that they may be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained. 7 The doctrine was extended
from consumable goods to motor vehicles and other products,8
where the defective condition made them unreasonably dangerous
to the user since it was felt that the one creating the risk and
reaping the profits should be liable, 9 instead of placing the over-
whelming burden of the cost of such injuries on those least able
to meet these consequences. 10
The foregoing reasons for the imposition of strict liability upon
the manufacturer of defective goods have merit, but there are con-
sequences which are not so beneficial to our society. Liability
without fault runs counter to the ordinary encouragement for care
and safety; prior to this new doctrine our laws had a definite
deterrent threat of liability upon the careless. Strict liability re-
quires no negligence or fault as seen above and this would lead
manufacturers to merely accept some losses and raise the cost
3. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor4 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2r 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5. Id.
6. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 891 P.2d 168 (1964).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
8. 41 ALI Proceedings 349, 351 (1965).
9. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1L2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
10. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
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of goods to cover them while, at the same time, relaxing their
safety standards.
Yet another drawback of imposing strict liability is that it
creates an unfair risk to the manufacturer, especially the one man
ownership business. Our economy thrives on the technological ad-
vances made in product design which has historically been en-
couraged, but now the strict liability law will place all the risk
of harm from such designs upon the producers and thus discourage
such advancement. 1 Dean Prosser, one of the leading expounders
of strict liability as a "risk spreader," saw its weaknesses when
he said,
Until we develop, a comprehensive system of compulsory
insurance along the lines of workmen's compensation with
rigidly limited damages . .- there will always be unin-
sured defendants, there will always be liability in excess
of coverage, and there will be members of the group
whose competitive, situation does not permit them to pass
on the cost of the insurance to their customers. 12
Lastly, the lucrative ease with which attorneys could prove
their cases, if strict liability of absolute quality were allowed,
could lead to a very serious ethics problem. 18
Turning now from the theoretical argument against a complete
adoption of the theory of strict products liability as in' absolute
liability upon sellers and producers, especially in products not to
be consumed, one must face the more practical problem of de-
termining what defenses are left under the "special" liability
which is imposed. Thus far the rule has been applied only to pro-
ducts sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in
which it was expected to reach the ultimate user.14 In a recent
case the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the manufacturer
was not liable for damages caused since a heater was not expected
to and did not reach the user "without substantial change in con-
dition" where a safety valve was to be installed on the heater.'
Closely related to..this idea is that concerned with misuse of a pro-
duct which is reflected in a Massachusetts case holding that there
would be no liability where specific directions for use were ignored. 6
A manufacturer is entitled to the normal use of his product and
11. Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 17 (1966).
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadcl. 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1121 (1960).
13. Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Pctition for Rc-
hearing, 42 U. DET. L. J. 343 (1965). This involves the temptations of bogus claims and
inflation of legitimate ones when coupled with the contingent fee standard with obvious
side affects of increased litigation load in many already overcrowded courts.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment p (1965).
15. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. I-lodges, 159 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
16. Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
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no liability rule should negate this expectation,1? for any product
would be dangerous if recklessly used, such as the case of a car
driven at an excessive speed.18 A product need only be reason-
ably fit for the use intended. 19
The defense lawyer may prove his client is not liable if he
can show the product was delivered in a safe condition and that
subsequent mishandling made it harmful. 20 The Mississippi court
appeared justified in attributing the sole proximate cause of an
explosion to the intervening failure of the contractor to install a
necessary safety valve, 2' just as a case relied upon for precedent
ruled that a processer's failure to follow the directions for use of
a chemical compound to be added to cattle feed had presented the
validity of the defense of intervening cause.22 This issue was
pointed out in an analogous case upon an alleged breach of im-
plied warranty, where the Utah court noted that a supplier may
rely upon a retailer of mettwurst to correctly cook the meat before
sale and is not liable for a case of trichinosis contacted from the
meat since the seller's failure was the sole cause of herm.2 3
Comments explaining the relevant section of the Restatement on
Torts reflect the next obvious defense to special liability actions.
There can be no contributory negligence relied upon when it con-
sists merely in failure to inspect the product by the user or to
further guard against a manufacturer's defect. It does, however,
exist under the label of assumption of risk when the user "vol-
untarily and unreasonably" proceeds while knowing of the defect."
Furthermore, when a warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded.2 3 The New Jersey26 and
Illinois 27 courts which so avidly accepted this new doctrine of
strict liability in tort have even substantially modified their po-
sition in recognizing the defense of contributory negligence. A fed-
eral court likewise has ruled that the failure to take a recom-
mended patch test to determine whether a user of hair dye might
be allergic to the product bars recovery when there is a reaction
to it.2s The extent of this procedure is shown by a North -Carolina
decision accepting contributory negligence as a defense in an
17. Malorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570. 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
18. Drummond v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Civil No. 771-098) (Cal. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist. 1966).
19. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177. 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
21. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, supra note 14.
22. E.. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So.2d 249 (1954).
23. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah2d 35, S27 P.2d 822 (1958).
24. FRSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
26. Id. at comment j.
26. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 484, 212 A.2d 769 (1966).
27. Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 222 N.E.2d 348 (111. App. Ct., 4th Dist. 1967).
28. PInto v. Clairol, Inc., 324 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1963).
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action brought in tort law while denying it in a warranty action
in the same case. 29
The special liability rule, it must be emphasized, applies only
to defective products, and the burden of proof that the product was
in a defective condition at the time it left the seller's hands is
placed upon the plaintiff.30 Thus, plaintiff was barred from re-
covery from designer for an accident resulting in the scalding of
a child because it was ruled that there was not sufficient proof
of a defect in design in the water system.81 An Illinois court denied
recovery for an injury to a child who was severely cut when she
fell under a power mower made by defendant since there could
be proven no actual design defect.3 2 A Missouri decision held
that a design, openly and obviously dangerous, cannot be the basis
for strict liability because the user should have realized the dan-
ger and avoided it.38 The theory also does not require a per-
fectly safe product since some products by nature are dangerous
in given circumstances, such as the anti-rabies vaccine developed
by Pasteur.3 4 The product must be unreasonably dangerous to a
consumer and harmful in such a way that the user would be un-
aware of the defect.35 A product, therefore, bearing a warning
that it is safe for use if the warning is followed, is not defective
or unreasonably dangerous. 6 Since such defenses as these have
been applied successfully in actions of products liability the point
is well taken that strict liability in tort is, indeed, a misnomer as
the Mississippi court has realized.
North Dakota has been advancing toward the acceptance of
complete liability of the producer or seller of goods. In 1931,
the Supreme Court indicated that privity was required in both ex-
press and implied warranty actions and also established a need
for fault.3t The policy, however, of doing away with the need of
privity was revealed in a 1965 suit to recover for. an injury sus-
tained due to a defectively designed potato harvester in which the
court held that a manufacturer had a duty to warn any user, even
in the absence of privity, about any danger inherent in the chat-
tel.88 The court required only reasonable care, relying on the NORTH
DAKOTA CENTURY CODE that "[e]very person is bound without con-
tract to abstain from injuring the person or property of another."89
29. Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 168, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941).
30. RzSTATEMENT (SECOND) o ToRTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
31. Schlpper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
82. Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 111. App.2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964).
33. Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964).
84. RESTATEMENT (SncoNn) or TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
35. Id. at comment 1.
36. Id. at comment J.
37. Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
38. Lindenberg v. Poison, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1965).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-01 (1961).
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In 1963, the increased burden of liability to sellers and
producers was forecast in a federal decision in an action for breach
of implied warranty which stated that privity was no longer re-
quired although the action was dismissed for lack of proof of neg-
ligence or fault. 40 This trend has culminated in the North Dakota
Supreme Court decision holding that a plaintiff in a products li-
ability action may maintain the action based upon an implied war-
ranty or an action in negligence even in the absence of privity.41
North Dakota, as it has eliminated the requirement of privity
even in implied warranty actions, has now progressed as far as
it should. The elimination of the privity requirement to a certain
degree of remoteness is a good and necessary modernization in
legal doctrine to meet the needs of our impersonal society. How-
ever, a word of caution - to eliminate the requirement of fault
is wrong. Any products liability action where the seller or man-
ufacturer is held liable for harm caused by a defective product
should be justified only upon proof of fault or negligence. The
many defenses mentioned herein should be allowed just as they
should be in a negligence action.
RICHARD MCKENNETT
40. U.S. Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963).
41. Lang v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).

